




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Barro, Robert J. and James W. Friedman. 1977. On





Accessed February 18, 2015 6:14:07 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451301
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's
DASH repository, and is made available under the terms
and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set
forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAOn Uncertain  Lifetimes 
Robert  J. Barro  and James W. Friedman 
University  of Rochester 
This  paper contrasts consumer choice  under uncertain lifetimes with 
the behavior that would arise if each individual's lifetime were announced 
at birth. In a model that includes life insurance and excludes investments 
in human capital, the expected utility under uncertain lifetimes exceeds 
that  under  known  lifetimes  when  the  latter  expectation  is  based on 
preannouncement survival probabilities. This conclusion emerges, first, 
because the model without human capital contains no planning benefits 
from knowledge of the horizon and, second, because the prior announce- 
ment  of lifetimes forces risk-averse consumers to  undertake  an  extra 
gamble that they could otherwise avoid by using life insurance. 
This  paper  explores  the  role  of  uncertain  lifetimes  in  an  intertemporal 
model  of  consumer  choice.  The  analysis  compares  the  behavior  of  con- 
sumption  and  utility  under  a  stochastic  horizon  with  that  which  would 
arise  under  certainty  where  each  individual's  length  of life  is announced 
at birth.  In  a model  that  includes  life insurance  and  excludes  investments 
in  human  capital,  the  expected  utility  under  uncertain  lifetimes  exceeds 
the  expected  utility  under  known  lifetimes  when  the  latter  expectation  is 
based  on  preannouncement  (ex  ante)  survival  probabilities.  This  con- 
clusion  emerges,  first, because  the  model  without  human  capital  accumu- 
lation  contains  no  planning  benefits  from  knowledge  of the  horizon;  and, 
second,  because  the  prior  announcement  of the  time  of death  forces  risk- 
averse  consumers  to  undertake  an  extra  gamble  that  could  have  been 
avoided  by  the  use  of life  insurance  in  the  uncertainty  case. 
The  possibility  of  accumulating  human  capital  implies  planning 
benefits  from  knowledge  of  the  time  of  death.  The  ability  to  match 
investments  with  the  horizon  implies  that  expected  lifetime  wealth  is 
lower  in the case of uncertain  lifetime  than  in the  case  where  lifetimes  are 
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announced  at birth.  The  effects  on expected  lifetime  utility  are ambiguous 
because  the  planning  benefit  from  knowledge  of  the  horizon  offsets  the 
cost  associated  with  risk aversion. 
One  other  result  is  that,  contrary  to  some  earlier  suggestions,  an 
uncertain  lifetime  is  not  a  rationale  for  time  preference  when  "perfect" 
life  insurance  is  admitted.  Although  survival  probabilities  below  unity 
imply  a  discount  on  future  utility,  they  imply  a  corresponding  discount 
in  the  budget  constraint  on  future  income  and  expenditure.  On  net, 
there  is no  effect  of uncertain  lifetime  on  the  preference  for current  con- 
sumption  relative  to future  consumption.' 
In  Section  I  a  model  is examined  in  which  the  individual's  lifetime  is 
uncertain  and  there  is no  human  capital  accumulation.  Section  II  deals 
with  a model  in which  the lifetime  is known,  though  randomly  determined 
at the start.  In  Section  III  the  models  of the  earlier  sections  are modified 
to allow  for the  accumulation  of human  capital. 
I.  Uncertain  Lifetime  with  No  Human  Capital 
Consider  a  consumer  who  lives  no  more  than  T periods,  with  the  prob- 
ability  of dying  at the  end  of the ith period  being pi. It is assumed  that,  at 
the  end  of  the  first  period,  a  random  draw  occurs.  With  probability  p1 
the  consumer  dies.  In  general,  if  the  consumer  lives  during  period  i,  a 
random  drawing  with  a  death  probability  of  pi/T  i pj  takes  place. 
Itis assumed thatpi  2  Ofori  =  1,...,  T  -  ',PT  >  OandZET 1pi  =  1. 
The  consumer  is viewed  as maximizing  expected  lifetime  utility,  which  is 
given  by 
U  =  u(Cl)  +  (1  -  Pl)U(C2)  +  +  (1  -  P  PT-  1)U(CT), 
(1) 
where  ci is consumption  and  u(ci)  is the satisfaction  enjoyed  during  the  ith 
period  of  the  lifetime.  Let  qi  =  1  -  ,J=I  pj(i  >  1)  be  the  probability 
as of birth  that  the person  survives  into  the ith period.  Then,  with  q 1  =  1, 
equation  (1)  can  be  written  as 
T 
U =  E  qiu(ci).  (2) 
i =  1 
The  function,  u(c), is assumed  to be increasing,  concave,  and differentiable. 
Thus,  u'  >  0  and  u" <  0.  Note  that  u" <  0 is often  interpreted  as  "risk 
aversion,"  and  also that  the lifetime  utility  function  contains  no discount- 
ing  of  future  enjoyments  beyond  that  which  is  included  in  the  survival 
probabilities.  2 
' This  result can  also be seen in case  C of Yaari  (1965),  which  is a continuous  time 
version of the discrete time model in Section  I. 
2  Some comments are made on the effects of discounting in n. 5 of Section  II. ON  UNCERTAIN  LIFETIMES  845 
Assume  that  the  market  interest  rate  is zero  (see  n.  5 below)  and  that 
the  individual  can  purchase  annuities  and  life  insurance  at  actuarially 
fair  prices,  as  well  as  being  able  to  borrow  and  lend.  These  market 
opportunities  make  possible  such diverse  contracts  as "negative  annuities," 
an  example  of which  is a  contract  where  the  consumer  receives  $1.00  at 
the  start  of period  1 and  repays  1/(1  -  p1) contingent  on  survival  at  the 
start  of  period  2.  To  duplicate  this  contract  with  a  loan  secured  by  life 
insurance,  the  consumer  borrows  1/(1  -  p1)  dollars  at  the  beginning  of 
period  1 and  pays  a  premium  of pI /  (1  -  p1)  dollars  for  a  1-period  life 
insurance  contract  that  pays  off  1/(1  -  p1)  dollars  at  the  beginning  of 
period  2  should  he  die  by  that  time.  For  an  additional  discussion  of 
contracts  of  this  sort,  see  Yaari  (1965).  The  present  framework  is  a 
discrete  version  of his  (continuous  time)  case  C. 
Taking  the  purchase  of  life  insurance  into  account,  the  budget  con- 
straint  is a requirement  of equality  between  expected  lifetime  income  and 
expected  consumption  expenditures.  Lety  be  the  income  received  during 
each  period  of  life,  A  the  initial  assets  of  the  consumer  (which  may  be 
negative),  and  FT the  expected  value  of lifetime  wealth  (which  must  be 
positive).  Then  the  budget  constraint  is 
T  T 
E  qici = y  qi +  A =  W  (3) 
i=1  i=1 
The  term  ZI=  qi  =  I is  the  expected  length  of  life;  hence,  expected 
lifetime  wealth  and  expected  length  of life  are related  by 
W  =  yi  +  A.  (4) 
It is immediate that the maximization of U(c1, ...,  CT)  =  i=I  qiu(ci)Z 
subject  to the budget  constraint  (eq.  [3]),  implies  the first-order conditions, 
U'(C1)  =  U'(C2)  =...  =  U'(CT)*  (5) 
That  these  first-order  conditions  correspond  to  a  (constrained)  utility 
maximum  follows  from  the  concavity  of U and  the linearity  of the  budget 
constraint. 
Thus,  an  optimal  plan  requires  a  constant  level  of  consumption  over 
time,  c  =  W/i  =  y  +  A/l,  and  the  expected  value  of  attained  lifetime 
utility  is 
U  u= Iu()  =  Iu(y  +  A/i).  (6) 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  uncertainty  of survival  is a rationale  for  the 
inclusion  of a discount  factor  on future  utility.3  This  observation  suggests, 
in  turn,  that  a person  living  in  a world  such  as that  modeled  here  would 
exhibit  a  positive  rate  of  time  preference  that  is,  with  a  zero  market 
3 See Bohm-Bawerk [1891]  1971, p. 255; Pigou  1962, p. 26; and Friedman  1969, p. 22. 846  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
rate  of  interest,  the  optimal  consumption  plan  would  call  for  a  rate  of 
consumption  that  declines  over  time.  This  argument  turns  out  to  be 
invalid  because  the same  "probability  discount  factors"  that  appear  in the 
objective  function,  equation  (2),  appear  also  in  the  budget  constraint, 
equation  (3). 
II.  Known  Lifetime  with  No  Human  Capital 
Consider  modifying  the  model  of  Section  I  to  allow  for  a  length  of  life 
that  is  randomly  selected  at  the  start  and  announced  at  that  time.  As 
before,  the probability  of dying  at the end  of the ith period  is pi.  However, 
at  the  moment  of  birth  a  random  draw  is  assumed  to  occur,  and  the 
consumer's  length  of  life,  t,  is  determined  and  announced  to  him.  It  is 
also  announced  to  any  economic  agent  who  might  make  an  insurance 
contract  with  him.  After  the  announcement  of t, the  consumer's  objective 
function  is 
U  =  E  u(ci),  (7) 
i =  1 
and  his budget  constraint  is 
Eci  =  yt  +  A  =  W(t).  (8) 
Note  that  the  ex  ante  survival  probabilities  are  absent  from  both  the 
objective  function  and  the  budget  constraint.  Of  course,  the  ex  post 
survival  probabilities  are present.  They  are  1 for each  of the  first t periods 
and  0 thereafter. 
Again,  the  optimal  consumption  plan  calls  for  a  constant  level  of 
consumption  over  time.  For  an  optimum, 
u'(cl)  =  u'(C2)  =  *  =  u'(Ct)  =  u'(c*),  (9) 
where 
c*  =  y  +  A/t.  (10) 
The  attained  level  of lifetime  utility  is 
U(t)  =  tu(c*)  =  tu(y  +  A/t).  (11) 
The  interesting  comparison  to  make  with  the  model  of  Section  I 
concerns  a  consumer  who  is  at  the  beginning  of  his  life  and  has  not  yet 
observed  the  outcome  of  the  random  draw  that  determines  t, his  length 
of  life.  His  expected  lifetime  utility  under  the  conditions  .of the  present 
section  is 
T 
E[U(t)]  =  E[tu(y  +  A/t)]  =  Epttu(y  +  Alt).  (12) 
t=  1 ON  UNCERTAIN  LIFETIMES  847 
Meanwhile,  the  maximum  value  of  expected  lifetime  utility  that  is 
attained  in  the  model  of  Section  I is 
U  =  lu(y  +  A/l)  =  U[E(t)].  (13) 
Accordingly,  the  question  of  whether  the  consumer  is  better  off  under 
the  risk of Section  I  or that  of the  present  section  comes  down  to  a com- 
parison  between  E[U(t)]  and  U[E(t)].  If  U(t)  is concave,  then Jensen's 
inequality  states  that  E[U(t)]  <  U[E(t)].'  It  is easily  verified  that  the 
concavity  of u(c) implies  the  concavity  of  U(t);  hence  Jensen's  inequality 
does hold.  Given  the conditions  that  A  7&  0, that  u is strictly  concave,  and 
that  at least  two  of the Pt are greater  than  zero, Jensen's  inequality  holds 
strictly.  Under  these circumstances,  the regime  of Section  I is preferable  in 
the  sense  that  it  yields  the  consumer  a  higher  value  of expected  lifetime 
utility,  as evaluated  at the beginning  of life. The  key element  that  produces 
this  result  is  that  the  consumer's  ability  to  buy  insurance  gives  him  the 
same  expected  lifetime  utility  as he would  have  if his lifetime  were  known 
with  certainty  to be  of length  1, the  mean  length  of life. 5 
In  the  model  of  the  present  section,  the  consumer  behaves  optimally, 
making  his  decision  after  his  length  of  life  is  determined.  He  does  not 
escape  having  to  take  part  in  a gamble-namely,  the  gamble  associated 
with  the  determination  of  t.6  Under  the  other  model,  his ability  to insure 
allows  him  to  consume  y  +  A/l  in  each  period  he  lives,  which  has  the 
effect  of removing  him  from  part  of the  gamble  into  which  nature  placed 
him.  He  does  not  escape  the  presence  of uncertainty  of length  of life,  but 
he  does  escape  the  utility  cost  associated  with  having  to  bear  the  conse- 
quent  risk of an uncertain  value  of W/t  the per period  amount  of wealth.7 
The  two  regimes  yield  the  same  utility  if A  =  0;  however,  the expected 
utility  derived  from  the  regime  of  Section  I  would  again  be  higher  if 
income,  y,  were  not  constant.  The  simplest  case  of  nonconstant  income 
occurs  when  the  consumer  is assumed  to  "work"  for a  number  of years, 
having  the  same  income  per year,  then  to  "retire"  at some  given  age  and 
have  no  employment  income  thereafter.  Such  assumptions,  without  con- 
On Jensen's inequality,  see Mood,  Graybill,  and Boes (1974),  p.  72. 
5  Since  the time  pattern of consumption  is uniform under both known and unknown 
horizons,  there  are  no  "planning  benefits"  that  derive  from knowledge  of  the  time  of 
death.  Introduction  of an interest rate or of a subjective rate of discount on future utility 
would  eliminate  the  constancy  of consumption  over time  but  would  not  eliminate  the 
correspondence  of  the  time  pattern  of consumption  for the  two  cases.  An  example  of 
planning  benefits from known lifetimes that are associated with human capital  accumu- 
lation is described in Section  III. 
6  There  is assumed  to be  no  possibility  of risk pooling  before the  announcement  on 
lifetime  occurs.  Insurance  possibilities  are irrelevant  after the  announcement  when  the 
length of life is known. 
7  Hirshleifer (1971,  p.  568)  discusses some analogous  situations  in which  information 
may not be socially  useful. The  length  of life can  be considered  part of the individual's 
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sideration  of a randomized  length  of life,  occur  in  Modigliani  and  Brum- 
berg  (1954). 
In  sum,  the  conclusion  can  be  expressed  as  follows.  Consider  two 
regimes:  regime  1  in  which  all  individuals  are  born  with  a  common 
probability  density  that  determines  the  length  of  life;  and  regime  2  in 
which  individuals  are labeled  at birth  with  a value  of t that  is drawn  from 
the  same  distribution.  The  model  implies  that  regime  1 is  preferable 
in the sense that,  if both  regimes  were  technically  feasible,  all  (risk-averse) 
members  of society  would  opt  for regime  1. 
The  analysis  is also  suggestive  for the  optimal  amount  of investment  to 
undertake  in  activities  that  yield  information  about  individual  life 
expectancy.  The  type  of argument  may  provide  a rationale  for maintain- 
ing  some  ignorance  about  the  state  of  health,  especially  where  terminal 
illness  may  be  involved. 
III.  Human  Capital 
The  planning  benefits  from  known  lifetimes  can  be  illustrated  by  intro- 
ducing  a variable  amount  of  human  capital.  In  a simple  case  all  of  the 
(nondepreciable)  amount  of  human  capital,  K,  is  acquired  during  the 
first  period  of  life.  Suppose  that  income  in  each  period  is  still  constant 
over  time  but  is  now  a  function  of  the  amount  of  human  capital,  as 
expressed  by  the  function,  f  (K),  where f'  >  0 and f  "  <  0. 
In  the  case  of an  uncertain  horizon  (the  model  of  Section  I),  the  only 
change  is a modification  of expected  lifetime  wealth  (eq.  [4])  to 
W=  f  (K)? +  A  -K.  (14) 
Choosing  K  to  maximize  expected  lifetime  utility  (when  an  interior 
maximum  exists)  results  in  the  first order  condition, 
f'(K)  =  I1/1.  (15) 
Letting  i  denote  the optimal  quantity  of human  capital,  the optimal  rate 
of consumption  is 
c  =f  (K)  +  (A  -  K)/i  =  WI  /,  (16) 
and  the  expected  value  of lifetime  utility  is 
e  =  1u(W/1/) =  u-[f  (K)  +  (A  -  k)/[].  (17) 
Turning  now  to  the  model  in  which  the  lifetime  is determined  before 
any  actions  are taken,  lifetime  wealth  is 
W(t)  =f(K)t  +  A  -  K,  (18) 
and  the  optimal  value  of human  capital,  K(t),  is the  solution  to 
f  '(K)  =  I /t.  (19) ON  UNCERTAIN  LIFETIMES  849 
The  assumptions  onf  ' assure  that  equation  (19)  has  at most one  solution 
with  K  >  0.  With  a knowledge  of  the  lifetime,  individuals  can  match  K 
with  t,  rather  than  basing  the  investment  decision  on  t.  Optimal  con- 
sumption  and  the  maximized  value  of attained  lifetime  utility  are 
c(t)  =  W1(t)/t =  f  [K(t)]  +  [A  -  K(t)]/t,  (20) 
U(t)  =  tu[W(t)/t]  =  tu{f[K(t)]  +  [A  -  K(t)]/t).  (21) 
Consider,  again,  an  ex  ante  calculation  of  expected  utility  when  t is 
distributed  in  accordance  with  (P15 .  . .  PT)  It  is straightforward  to show 
that  expected  lifetime  wealth  is higher  under  the  case of known  horizon- 
that  is, 
E[W(t)]  >  W[E(t)]  (22) 
This  conclusion  follows  from  the  convexity  of  W in  t and  the  application 
ofJensen's  inequality.  '  Intuitively,  it may  be  thought  of as resulting  from 
the  ability  to  make  the  investment  decision  after  the  lifetime  is  known, 
which  provides  a perfect  match  between  K and  t. 
It  is  now  not  clear  whether,  in  the  presence  of  human  capital  invest- 
ment  (or  analogous  considerations  that  produce  planning  benefits  from 
knowledge  of  the  horizon),  the  consumer  is  better  off  having  his  length 
of life randomly  determined  prior to any  decisions  at the start of period  1, 
or having  a random  drawing  at  the  end  of each  period  that  he  survives. 
In  the  former  situation  he  can  make  a  perfect  match  of  human  capital 
investment  to his  (known)  lifetime,  but  he cannot  take out  insurance  that 
guarantees  him  a per  period  amount  of consumption  that  corresponds  to 
living  the  mean  length  of  life.  Obviously,  which  of  these  two  elements 
predominates  depends  on  the  particular  utility  function,  investment 
function,  and  probability  distribution  that  apply. 
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